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CENTRALIZED INFORMATION
SYSTEMS AND THE LEGAL RIGHT
TO PRIVACY
JEFFREY A. MELDMAN*
The complexity of the policy decisions that have been explored in
recent years and the increasing availability of new technologies for col-
lecting, transmitting, and processing information have caused an increas-
ing demand by government, university; and priv ate sectors for more
efficient access to information about multitudinous aspects of the lives
of individuals. Most recently these demands have been in the form of a
desire for national centers for handling such information in an orderly
and comprehensive manner. Concurrent with these visions of data cen-
ters, however, considerable fear has been voiced about the threats that
centralized information may pose to the sanctity and privacy of the indi-
vidual. Thd always increasing number of files and records of personal in-
formation has been bringing more and more information about individual
Aives into the public light, and critics of this trend have become worried
fhat the "Big Brother" society prophesied by George Orwell may be very
close at hand.
The context of the debate about centralized data centers has focused
on the conflict between two realms of value, the value of greater under-
standing of society and of more intelligent methods of policy formula-
tion, and the value of allowing an individual to keep information about
himself and his life private knd unknown to others. But conflicts of
value are neither new to the American experience, nor haVe they been
unmanageable by the social systems and institutions that embody and
structure such social values.
The legal system in America has been constantly faced with value
conflicts brought about by changing technology, and it has so far shown
itself to be basically well-adapted to deal with them. The legislatures,
courts, and other legal and quasi-legal institutions have demonstrated
considerable success in analyzing, balancing, and resolving sets of values
that necessarily differ in a democratic society. The wide-felt reluct-
ance to change values rapidly-itself a value concept-is inbred in the
*Member, Wisconsin Bar; S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965;
LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1968.
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legal process, through its doctrine of precedent and its reliance on es-
tablished frames of reference in considering new proposals.
This article will explore the extent to which this legal system may be
able to resolve the conflicts suggested by the establishment of centralized
information systems. It will examine how the existing legal concepts of
a right to privacy might be able to protect individuals from possible en-
croachments on their privacy by such data systems and, to the extent
that present legal concepts may be inadequate, it will suggest how addi-
tional legal protection of privacy might be effected in a manner that will
still allow a maximum recognition of the valuable advantages that would
derive from centralization of information about individual members of
the society.
THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEMS
Centralization of information has become a goal of persons engaged
in almost every kind of activity that depends heavily on analysis of data.
Data collection has tended, until recently, to operate in a piecemeal
manner so that small pools of uncomprehensive data are scattered
throughout the country geographically, as well as at various institutional
levels. Much of this data does not relate to the circumstances of the
lives of individuals. Considerable scientific and technological statistics,
much medical knowledge (except for case histories), and many legal
authorities are decentralized, but these are also relatively harmless to
individual privacy. Standardization and centralization of this kind of
data are being demanded by participants in these fields' without much
concern by the public about possible invasions of individual privacy.
Certain demands for centralized information, however, do pertain to
information about individuals. Research in the behavioral sciences, in-
formation for urban, regional, and national policy and planning, and
operations of law enforcement agencies could be greatly enhanced by
comprehensive personal information about each citizen. Information
centers that serve these purposes are the ones that pose possible threats
to the privacy of the individual, and proposals for these systems must
be viewed with consideration of the privacy problem.
There are two basic kinds of data centers in this category. One is
the central intelligence center that would contain complete information
about each individual in the society and that would be used by law en-
forcement agencies and other governmental bodies to find out facts
about a particular citizen under investigation.2 The other is the central
statistical ceriter that would contain similar information, but that would
be used only to find out statistical facts about groups of citizens, or pop-
ulations, to aid in understanding the society, itself, and in making policy
decisions in planning for the society.
I See, e.g., TOWARD A NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM, (M. Rubinoff ed. 1965).
2 Rothman, Centralized Govermnent Information Systems and Privacy, TRW
SYSTEMS, Sept. 22, 1966, at 1.
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This article is primarily concerned with the statistical centers, for it
is these centers that are currently being seriously proposed as a substan-
tian benefit to social welfare. The intelligence systems must be briefly
discussed, however, for there has been a significant tendency to confuse
the two kinds of systems, and there is also considerable fear that statisti-
cal systems could be used for intelligence purposes.
Central Intelligence Systems
The characterizing feature of an intelligence data system is that its
records would comprise accessible information about identified individu-
als. Every citizen presently generates a large number of records, public
and private, as he proceeds through life, and all of these records could
be combined into a centralized master file. Such centralization of birth
records, census records, medical records, school records, employment
records, bank records, credit bureau records, court and police records,
social security records, marriage records, consumer records, tax records,
military records, and others3 would allow an investigator to acquire de-
tailed information about a particular individual much faster and much
less expensively than is now possible. Such a system would be of par-
ticular value to law enforcement agencies and other governmental bodies
that rely on knowledge about individuals, and it would no doubt be of
much use to private organizations such as credit bureaus and investiga-
tive agencies.
It is this system of centralized citizen dossiers that appears to con-
flict most squarely with notions of individual privacy. Its very purpose
of providing immediate access to every last detail about a private citizen
is directly opposed to the citizen's claim to privacy of personal informa-
tion, and this is true whether such information would be generally avail-
able or available only to official bodies. The only advantage that these
systems promise, in return for their serious encroachments upon the
privacy of the lives of individuals, is a reduction of costs and delay in
governmental operations.4 The American society has always shown in
its governmental structuring a strong preference for tolerating govern-
mental inefficiency, rather than permitting the occurrence of unchecked
power.5 For this reason, perhaps, there has been little support for com-
prehensive systems of this kind.
Centralized Statistical Systerns
Although the information contained in a statistical information
center is similar to that in an intelligence center, the organization of the
information and the kind of data that can be recovered from the system
are considerably different. Users of a statistical system would not be
3 P. Baran, The Data Bank v. the Individual's Right-to-Privacy, Sept. 1966, at
5 (draft for an article in DATAmATION).
4 Rothman, supra note 2, at 4.
5 Baran, supra note 3, at 1.
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interested in the personal -information pertaining to any individual citi-
zen, but rather in the characteristic data about various populations and
the correlations between these characteristics. Behavioral scientists and
governmental planning bodies are interested in learning about the rela-
tionships of demographic, economic, and other social characteristics of
groups of individuals, but have no interest in knowing the identity of
individuals with particular characteristics, nor in knowing anything
about the lives of any particular individual.
The base of information in a statistical system would comprise the
same kind of assimilation of personal records that make up an intelli-
gence system, but access to the information in the form of personal
records would not be necessary. A method of retaining the identity of
the individual within the system would be neceessary to permit proper
matching of one set of facts about an individual with other sets of facts,
so that correlations would be possible. But it would not be necessary for
this identity to be accessible in any way. Procedures for insuring that
these identities remain totally unknown wouldt not in any way hamper
the proper goals of users of statistical systems.
The availability of centralized information of this kind could be of
considerable -aid to scientific attempts to understand the dynamics of
the social milieu, and to attempts by policy makers to discover more ac-
curately the conditions and needs of the various sectors of the population
and to be able to predict more accurately the effects that proposed deci-
sions.might have on these conditions and needs.
At the present time, information of a statistical nature is widely
scattered among diverse governmental and private institutions through-
out the country. The Bureau of the Budget, itself, lists 21 separate
bureaus that provided for their own statistical program in the fiscal
year 1967.6 Much of the information is duplicate and impossible to corre-
late with information in other pools. Major reasons for this are: (1)
the inability of separate agencies to keep track of the data collection
programs of other agencies; (2) the lack of standards in classification
and organization of statistics; (3) the tendencies of statistical study
groups to publish only final results pertinent to a particular study and
to destroy the micro-information on which these findings are based;
and, (4) the immediate dissociation of the identities of individuals from
their records, making impossible the later record-matching which is
necessary for correlation studies. Centralized, standardized, and com-
prehensive records on each individual would alleviate all four of these
handicaps, and the disclosure of internal identities would in no way be
necessary or even desirable in such a system.
6 U.S. BuREAu OF THE BuDET, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE STORAGE OF
AND ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT STATISTICS [The "Kaysen Report"] 3 (1966).
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The Proposal for a Statistical System
The major current proposal for a statistical information system orig-
inated in 1965 with a committee of the Social Science Research Council,
which recommended the creation of a National Data Center. 7 This pro-
posal was investigated and reviewed for the Office of Statistical Stand-
ards of the Bureau of the Budget by Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., in the fall of
the year." The Dunn Report pointed out the advantages of a centralized
system, but, unfortunately, it neglected to consider the problems of pri-
vacy that might ensue from such a system.
Congressional concern as to these issues of privacy led to a series of
hearings before a House Subcommittee chairmanned by Representative
Cornelius E. Gallagher of New Jersey, during the summer of 1966.9 The
subcommittee heard testimony from representatives of the Bureau of the
Budget, from Mr. Dunn, from computer experts, from sociologists,
economists, and others, concerning-the technical organization of such a
center and concerning the effects that such a center might have on indi-
vidual privacy. The general conclusion of Congressman Gallagher was
that the present state of computer technology was inadequate to prevent
the grave encroachments upon person privacy that would follow from a
National Data Center, and that the value of preserving this privacy far
outweighed the financial, educational, and policy-planning advantages of
the system.'0
The objections of the Gallagher Subcommittee focused on three
basic areas of concern: (1) Centralized dossiers of citizens would keep
an individual's past continually available to present discovery. Gallagher
emphasized the Judeo-Christian concept of forgiving and forgetting a
man's past and letting him make amends and begin again. The computer,
Gallagher argued, cannot forget and is incapable of forgiving;"' (2)
Centralized computer files are highly vulnerable to widespread and sur-
reptitious access.' The subcommittee was particularly disturbed by the
lack of legal and technological means of insuring foolproof security for
the information in the system; and, (3) Systems established for purely
statistical purposes are just as vulnerable and just as potentially danger-
ous to privacy as are intelligence systems. This conclusion derives from
the necessity of retaining the identity of individuals within the system,
in order that record matching be possible. The remainder of this article
will investigate how these objections are expressed in the traditional
7 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, INFORMATION CONCERN-
ING THE PRoPosED FEDERAL DATA CENTER (Aug., 1966).8 U.S. BuREAu OF THE BuDaar, REvmw OF A PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL DATA
CENTER [The "Dunn Report"] (Dec., 1955).
9 Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 26-28,
1966).
10 112 CoNG. REC. 19,961-65 (1966) (remarks of Representative Gallagher).
12 Id. at 19,962.
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legal concepts of the right to privacy, how the current legal doctrines
operate to protect privacy, and how further legal measures might be de-
sirable and effective in establishing useful statistical centralization that
is capable of avoiding invasions of this privacy.
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICAN LAW
Like the English legal system upon which it is based, American law
comprises several interconnected spheres of authority. The common law
formulated by the courts is an assimilation of past judicial opinions
handed down in the various jurisdictions. It evolves as the courts at-
tempt to fit the factual cases they hear into the patterns and doctrines
that they have developed in previous cases. More codified legal rules
exist in the form of statutes and regulations formulated by the legisla-
tures, as representatives of the populace, and by bureaus and agencies
created to administer particular realms of activity. Although the courts
retain the power to interpret them, these codifications are often pre-
cipitated by the inadequacies of, or discontent with, the slowly evolving
common law. Both of these legal spheres are, in turn, restricted by
the mandates of the Constitution (again, subject to court interpretation),
which provides the ultimate authority for the existence of the legislative,
judicial, and executive powers.
The legal concept of privacy, like many legal concepts, has developed
as separate doctrines in these different legal spheres. Each of these
spheres must therefore be considered to understand the basic nature of
privacy as it is recognized and protected by the law.
Common Law Protection of Privacy
The major realm of protection of privacy in the common law has
been in the law of torts. 12 In this field, an invasion of a person's privacy
is considered to be a wrong perpetrated by the invader, for which the
victim can sue in a court of law for compensation. This common-law
right to privacy developed mainly from the undesirable effects of two
technologies quite different from the recent technology of data process-
ing-namely from the progress in photography and newspaper publish-
ing in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Tendencies toward
yellow journalism in this period of history placed in public view intimate
facts and pictures of people's lives that previously had been considered
highly private matters. Individuals who were victimized by this new
and widespread press coverage appealed to the courts for protection.
Prior to 1890, there were only a few courts that considered such
invasions as tortious. In a case heard in 1881, a woman was allowed re-
covery for an intrusion, during her childbirth, of a young man pretend-
ing to be a medical assistant. 3 Several of the courts that permitted such
12 Karst, The Files: Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored
Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 342, 347 (1966).
13 De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160,9 N.W. 146 (1881).
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recovery did so under the doctrine that an individual had a right to be
left alone. This right was not really established, however, until 1890,
when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published an article in the
Harvard Law Review14 strongly advocating the universal recognition of
privacy as a personal right that should be protected by the courts. The
authors of the article traced previous cases of recovery that were per-
mitted under doctrines of defamation, property rights, and breach of
confidence and contract, claiming that it was really privacy that the
courts had been protecting. In this way, they tried to establish precedent
for the doctrine and to convince the courts that a doctrine of privacy,
per se, would be a more appropriate way to handle cases of disclosure
of private information. The courts slowly began to follow the suggestion
of this article. So many of them relied on the article for precedent that
the article is often considered as having "created" the right to privacy.
As recognition of this right became more widespread, protection of
privacy became divided into four basic areas :15 (1) protection against
the intrusion on the seclusion or solitude, or into the private affairs, of
an individual; (2) protection against public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts of an individual; (3) protection against publicity which
places an individual in a false light; and, (4) protection against the ap-
propriation of an individual's name or likeness (e.g., photograph) for
monetary advantage. The first two of these areas of protection are the
most relevant to the privacy problem of centralized information systems.
Protection against intrusion was at first applied only to cases of
physical intrusion or physical searches of an individual's person or pri-
vate property and, as such, the doctrine overlapped, to a considerable
extent, the tort doctrines of trespass. Protection was then extended to
cover certain kinds of sensory intrusion such as peering at individuals
through windows and eavesdropping on private conversations with
microphones or wiretaps. Protection against sensory intrusion was also
applied to allow recovery for persistent and unwanted telephone calls to
an individual.
The intrusion doctrine has also been extended to the area of per-
sonal records. In Zimmerman v. Wilson,'1 decided in 1936, for example,
a federal court held that an unauthorized prying into the plaintiff's bank
records was a tortious invasion of the plaintiff's privacy. Protection in
this area, however, has not been recognized to a significant extent.
Protection against public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
developed more slowly. The earliest independent application of the doc-
trine occurred in 1927 in Brents v. Morgan."1 The defendant in this case
had posted a sign in the window of his garage proclaiming that the
's Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HA.v. L. R.v. 193 (1890).
Is Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALir. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
16 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936).
1r 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
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plaintiff owed him a sum of money and the court found that this public
disclosure had invaded the debtor's privacy. Disclosure of embarrassing
facts from an individual's past has also been protected by law. The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals allowed recovery in Melvin v. Reid," 8in 1931,
for the defendant's acts of publicizing the plaintiff's past immoral ways.
The court held that all men have the right of pursuing and obtaining hap-
piness and that the dredging up of unfavorable facts from an individual's
past invades this right. This doctrine has been applied to such past facts
as victimization in a robbery, indebtedness, medical history, and personal
conduct. 19 Facts pertaining to sentimental associations have also been
protected against public disclosure, 20 as have the contents of personal
letters.2 1
At present, the majority of the states afford court protection of this
kind against invasions of privacy. A minority of the states do not recog-
nize a right to privacy in the common law, most of them allowing protec-
tion only where the invading action is proscribed by statute." Over the
past fifty years, however, there has been an increase in the number of
states that do recognize common-law protection. That number has grown
from fifteen states in 19422 to over thirty states at the present time. 4
The usual form of relief granted by the courts for these invasions is
an award of substantial damages. Since the nature of the tort is emotion-
al distress rather than monetary loss, specific damages need not be al-
leged or proven. Nor is the difficulty in assessing the amount of the
damages considered to be a bar to recovery. In addition, punitive dam-
ages may be awarded if malice on the part of the defendant can be
shown. Injunctive relief, by which the court grants a request to enjoin
a threatened invasion of privacy, has been rare. This is probably because
the right to privacy is generally regarded as a personal right, rather than
as a property right, and because most courts of equity grant injunctive
relief only when property rights are involved.' 5
Legislative Protection of Privacy
Protection of the right to privacy in both state and federal statutes
has been relatively spotty and non-comprehensive. Laws have been
enacted partly as a response to the failure of the common law to protect
rights of privacy and partly as a complement to other statutory pro-
visions pertaining to official records. As such, the statutes rarely attempt
to treat the issues of privacy in an integrated manner.
Several states have created statutes proscribing the exploitation of
18 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
19 Prosser, supra note 15, at 393.
20 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, ToRTs § 9.6, at 682 (1956).
2141 AM. JUR. Privacy § 31 (1938).
2277 C.J.S. Right of Privacy § 1(b) (1952) ; Am. JUR. Privacy § 8 (1938).
2"Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950).
24 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 112, at 831 (3d ed. 1964).
2541 Am. JUR. Privacy §§ 34-35 (1938).
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individuals' names arid pictures for commercial purposes, but these
laws usually comprehend the actual use of a person's name or photo-
graph in advertising or in a commercial product such as a motion pic-
ture or novel. They do not apply to the use of private information within
a commercial activity if that information is not actually publicized along
with the identity of the individuals involved.
There has, however, been a relatively small amount of recent legis-
lation aimed at curbing eavesdropping and electronic surveillance. New
York, for example, proscribes the possession of devices such as "bug-
ging" and transmitting equipment for the purpose of unconsented-to
eavesdropping, as well as the use of such devices for eavesdropping on
conversations in which no party has consented to the surveillance or
recording. -Despite these laws, however, the use, sale, and advertising
of these devices is widespread throughout the state. Only two states,
Maryland and Oregon, proscribe eavesdropping on conversations in
which not all of the parties have given their consent.28
Almost all states have statutory provisions for the accessibility of
official records. These provisions are usually scattered throughout the
statutes, appearing in the sections of the statutes that provide for the
existence of the many kinds of governmental records with which a
state functions. As each governmental department or agency is created,
provisions for the necessary record-gathering and bookkeeping are gen-
erally enacted at the same time. The laws pertaining to access of these
records therefore widely vary among the different sets of records kept
within a state. Most official records are established as "public," which
usually means that anyone may have access to them, but certain more
sensitive information, such as tax or health records, is defined as "con-
fidential." Various levels of confidentiality exist. Some information may
be available to any governmental'body or to certain governmental bodies
upon a showing of a good reason for obtaining the information, or it
may be unavailable to anyone outside the original record-gathering body.
Quite often, however, the accessibility of records is unclear in the statu-
tory provisions, and questions of accessibility are left up to the discretion
of the keeper of the records.2 7 Regardless of the classification of the
records as public or confidential, however, an individual is generally
permitted to have access to his own records, and there is usually some
procedure by which he can rectify errors, even if he has to resort to the
courts to do it.
One of the most imaginative methods for handling accessibility of
police records is a California statute pertaining to criminal prosecutions
of minors. Under the California laws, a minor who is acquitted, or who
serves a successful term of probation, is not only released from all pen-
26 AssociATIoN OF THE BAR OF T CITY OF NEW YoRK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
SCIENCE AND LAW, MONITORING DEVIcES AND LAWYERS number 9, at 3 (1965).
27 Karst, supra note 12, at 348.
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alties, but is entitled to have all records pertaining to the criminal action
sealed and to have the proceedings "deemed" not to have existed. He is
further entitled to answer any future questions that may be asked of
him-even under oath in court-as if the proceedings had never oc-
curred . 2 Courts, too, have been known occasionally to seal their own
decisions when a release to the public would be devastating to innocent
parties. The court in United Statese v. McLeod2" ordered the arrests and
convictions of the defendants, who were unlawfully prosecuted, to be
expunged from the records.
Federal legislation has so far been even less concerned with privacy
than has state law. Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 pro-
hibited interception and disclosure of telephone calls, and the Supreme
Court in 1937 held that this restriction applied to law enforcement
agencies as well as to private individuals.3 0 However, in 1941 the Attor-
ney General ruled that section 605 would be violated by the government
only if the interception and disclosure were both outside the government.
This interpretation diluted the applicability of the provision consider-
ably, and it has not been very useful in preventing wiretapping since
that time.
The statutory provisions for the gathering and keeping of records
within the federal government are similar to those of the states. Most
federal records are public and open to universal access, but many are
confidential. Confidential records may be open to certain other federal
agencies, or they may be completely closed. The records of the Bureau
of the Census, for example, are not accessible to any other federal
agency, not even to Congress.
3
1
Certain federal statutes have privacy provisions that are integral to
the purposes of the acts themselves. The Civil Rights Act, for example,
prohibits the gathering or disclosing of racial information in the areas
in which it proscribes racial discrimination.32
The most far-reaching attempt so far at bringing privacy under the
protection of federal legislation has been the proposed Right of Privacy
Act, introduced in the Senate in February, 1967.33 This act is aimed
particularly at invasions of privacy by eavesdropping and electronic sur-
veillance, the same problem that a few states have tried to solve with
local statutes. The bill bases its authority on the commerce clause of the
Constitution, claiming that wire communications are normally conducted
through interstate facilities and that the manufacture, distribution, and
use of eavesdropping devices are facilitated by interstate commerce. The
28 Id., at 366.
29 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
30 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
31 REPORT OF THE TAsK FORCE, supra note 6, at 7, Annex-1.
32 Rothman, supra note 2, at 9.
33S . 928, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The text of S. 928 is found in 113 CONG.
REC. 2910-11 (1967).
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act would provide for a sentence of five years and a fine of $10,000 for
the willful interception or disclosure of any wire communication without
the permission of at least one party to the communication. It would also
provide for a sentence of one year and a fine of $25,000 for the manu-
facture, shipping, or advertising of any device primarily useful for inter-
ception of wire communication. For purposes of the statute, "wire com-
munication" includes any communication made in whole or in part by
aid of wire, cable, or connection, furnished or operated by any common
carrier in interstate or foreign communication.
Constitutional Protection of Privacy
When the United States Constitution was framed, there was not yet
any concept of a "right to privacy," as such, and the right is therefore
understandably absent in the enumeration of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to every citizen. Because of the recent technological ad-
vances in eavesdropping and surveillance, however, the same concern
that has led to common-law and statutory recognition of this right has
also led to attempts at interpreting the Constitution in a way that affords
protection from the invasion of privacy by agents of the federal govern-
ment, and through the Fourteenth Amendment, from agents of state
governments, as well.
The first constitutional case to face the question of governmental
wiretapping was Olmstead v. United States,34 decided in 1928. The
police in this case used a direct wiretap to eavesdrop on the telephone
conversations of the defendant. The Supreme Court held that such wire-
tapping did not violate any of the defendant's constitutional rights be-
cause the conversation was intangible and could not therefore be a sub-
ject of an illegal siezure prohibited by the fourth amendment. It also
held that there could be no illegal search, also prohibited by the fourth
amendment, since the police did not commit an actual physical trespass.
Twenty-six years later, in Irvine v. California,35 the court did hold
police eavesdropping to be an unconstitutional search and seizure, but
in this case the police had entered the defendant's home and planted
microphones in the wall, as well as in the bedroom, of the defendant and
his wife. Similarly, in Silverman v. United States,36 in 1961, the police
slipped a spike mike under the baseboard of a wall connecting the de-
fendant's residence with a room in the adjoining building, thereby gain-
ing contact with the heating duct in the defendant's dwelling. Again the
court held that there was an unconstitutional search, only because there
had been an "unauthorized physical penetration into the premises.
3 7
Mr. Justice Douglas based his concurring opinion on the theory that
- 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
35347 U.S. 128 (1954).
36365 U.S. 505 (1961).
37 Id., at 509.
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what had actually been violated was the defendant's right to privacy,
but the majority refused to follow this approach.
In Lanza v. New York,38 the police eavesdropped on the defendant
while he was, conversing with his brother, a prisoner, in a prison visiting
room. Once more denying the existence of a personal right to privacy,
the Supreme Court held that, unlike a house or hotel room or business
office, a prison visiting room was not a "constitutionally protected
area."39 These and similar cases demonstrate the court's reluctance to
recognize an independent constitutional right to privacy in the area of
search and seizre.
To the extent that seizable evidence is both personal and directly
incriminating, however, another line of cases suggests that a right of
privacy may be recognized in association with the right against self-
incrimination and denial of due process. In a 1952 Supreme Court case,
Rochin v. California,40 three deputy sheriffs had forced their way into
the defendant's room after having received "some information" that the
defendant was selling narcotics. The deputies noticed two capsules lying
in a night stand beside the defendant's bed, and when they called his
attention to them, the defendant immediately put them into his mouth.
The deputies tried forcibly to extract the capsules from his mouth, and
when they failed, they handcuffed the defendant and took him to a hos-
pital where they ordered a doctor to administer an emetic which finally
caused the defendant to vomit the capsules. The capsules were found to
contain morphine and were used as evidence against the defendant at
his trial. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction, hold-
ing that such illegal invasion of the defendant's privacy so shocked the
conscience and so offended a sense of justice that denial of due process
was clear. However, in Schinerber v. California,41 decided fourteen years
later, the court upheld a conviction based on evidence of the alcohol con-
tent of the defendant's blood, a sample of which was taken by police
order against his will. The court found no violation of the defendant's
right against unreasonable search and seizure because blood tests had
become so "commonplace." The court found no violation of the de-
fendant's right against self-incrimination or a denial of due process be-
cause he was not compelled to testify against himself and because the
blood test did not offend a sense of justice. The court did not mention
the defendant's privacy. Why blood extraction should be considered so
much less offensive than stomach-pumping is not particularly clear, but,
apparently, if any right to privacy exists in this area, it is a right against
shockingly offensive invasions only.
38 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
39 Id., at 142.
40 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
41384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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The first Supreme Court decision to rely directly on an independent
right to-privacy was Griswold v. Connecticut,4 decided in 1965. In this
case, the court struck down'a state statute prohibiting the use of contra-
ceptives, holding that the statute was an unconstitutional invasion of the
privacy of married couples. Mr. Justice Douglas, now speaking for the
majority, emphasized that many of the guarantees -specifically set out
in -the Bill of Rights create zones of privacy that must be protected if
full meaning is to be given to the enumerated rights. Mr. Justice
Goldberg in a. concurring opinion, relied heavily on the ninth amend-
ment (which provides for retention by the people of rights not specific-
ally enumerated), in contending that the right of -a married couple to
privacy is a basic and fundamental personal right. Only Messrs. Justices
Black and Stewart dissented, denying that there was a basis for a right
to privacy in the Constitution. As a result of this case, the right to pri-
vacy finally gained clear constitutional recognition.
LEGALLY RECOGNIZED DEFENSES AND JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR INTRUSIONS UPON THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The spheres of the common law, statutory law, and constitutional
law have developed several areas of protection of individual privacy.
The areas of protection have been seen to be somewhat different in the
various spheres. The common-law protection has been concerned chiefly
with the emotional disturbance caused by intrustion into, and public dis-
closure of, an individual's private affairs. Privacy statutes have aimed'
mainly -t preventing undesirable eavesdropping and surveillance. Con-
stitutional protection, where it exists, pertains only to invasions of pri-
vacy by the government in the prosecution of criminal actions. Taken
together, these measures of protection do not cover' the entire.realm of
privacy. Even in the areas they do cover, there are numerous exceptions
to the application of the protection. These exceptions illustrate how- the
law has had to balance the value of privacy against the- values that a com-
plete protection of privacy would attenuate, and they demonstrate how
the privacy issues of centralized information centers will have to be in-
tegrated with these other social values.
Inoffensive Invasions of Privacy
In a society that is based on complex interrelations among its mem-
bers, there can be no absolute right to privacy. Total privacy would im-
ply a complete lack of contact, a "zero-relationship," with the rest of
the world.43 Only an eremite would be able to achieve such complet6
privacy-and few members of society would desire to live the eremite's
life. Those intrusions of privacy that amount to no more than the basic
activities of social intercourse must therefore be excepted fromh legal
42381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4 Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
281 (1966).
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curtailment. Accordingly, the law does not provide redress for invasions
or annoyances that are reasonable, inoffensive, and unobjectionable to a
reasonable man of ordinary sensitivities.44 The courts will not allow re-
covery for these commonplace intrusions, statutes are rarely written to
prohibit them, and, as was demonstrated by the Schmerber case, the
Constitution has never been interpreted as proscribing them.
The standard against which offensiveness is measured is necessarily
one of the current mores and standards of decency of the society at a
given time. In today's world of intensive communication, most individu-
als do not consider telephone calls or "junk" mail or an occasional print-
ing of their names or photographs in the newspaper as particularly
offensive. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak45 is an interesting illus-
tration of how an individual's standards of offensiveness must often
give way to the community standard. The issue in this case was a com-
muter's complaints about the music, news, and weather reports that were
played inside the public buses in which he rode to work each day. The
court held for the commission, finding that the audio programs were
reasonable and in the general interest of the other passengers.
Non-Public Disclosures
In order for disclosures of private information to be tortious, they
must be made to the public at large, not merely to another individual.
The courts have held that there is no invasion of privacy if a person
tells an individual's employer about the individual's debts, or even if he
tells a small group of people, unless there is a breach of confidence.4"
Under Pennsylvania law, a photograph that invades an individual's pri-
vacy is "published" each time it is shown to a third person,47 but, in
general, an invasion by disclosure must include substantial publicity.
Disclosure of Public Facts
A further exception in the protection against disclosure of personal
information is made for the disclosure of "public facts"-that is, facts
that are generally accessible to the public. Any personal characteristic or
information that is publicly visible cannot be protected from further dis-
closure. When an individual goes out into a public place, he must leave
many of his claims to privacy behind. Following a philosophy similar to
that underlying the exception for inoffensive invasions, the courts have
denied individuals the right to be alone-or unphotographed-in public.
4 s
A similar distinction is made between public and private records.
Governmental records that have no legislative restrictions as to access
are generally considered "public," and are not protected from disclosure.
4 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 20, § 9.5, at 678; Prosser, supra note 15,
at 396.
45343 U.S. 451 (1952).
46 Prosser, supra note 15, at 391.
7 Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 132 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
48 Prosser, supra note 15, at 391.
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Birth records, military service records, court testimony (including pre-
trial hearings), and police measurements and fingerprints (if authorized)
fall into this category. Government records that are in any way confi-
dential, or that have access restrictions, are generally considered to be
private, as are records kept by non-governmental concerns. Tax and
census records are examples of public records that are protected from
public disclosure.
Consent
One of the major defenses for the invasion of an individual's privacy
is that the individual has consented to the invasion. It makes common
sense, as well as legal sense, that a person should not be able to complain
about an act to which he has consented, but it is not always clear when
such consent exists, nor is it always simple to ascertain the extent to
which a person has consented to the invasion.
Consent is a valid defense whether it is express, implied, or inferred
from conduct. 49 In a society that is growing increasingly dependent upon
information transfer, however, it is easy to infer consent in situations
where an individual is partly coerced into giving information. An appli-
cant for a job is expected routinely to fill out an employment question-
naire that may contain a considerable amount of sensitive information.
Applicants for loans or credit are faced with similar requests. Often
there are questions on such forms that are not directly relevant to the
purposes of the instrument, but the applicant knows that a recalcitrant
refusal to supply some of the information, because it is too personal,
will meet with prompt disfavor on the part of the person who will make
the job or credit decision. It is difficult to conceive of information given
under these circumstances as voluntary, but consent to use information
obtained in these standard ways is almost always inferred.
Legally, the consent applies only to that use of the information which
was consented to.50 The information may not be passed on to others for
other uses that invade an individual's privacy. In practice, however, it is
difficult to prevent this kind of traffic in personal information because
of the difficulty in tracing it. The taxpayer in Zimmerman v. Wilson5'
was able to enjoin his bank from relaying his account information to
the Internal Revenue Service, but exchanges of information usually oc-
cur without the individual's knowledge and he is usually unable to pre-
vent it.
Need to Know
There is also a series of important justifications for invasions of pri-
vacy that have been held to outweigh the individual's right to keep per-
sonal information private. In order for society to function in an orderly
manner, for example, the right of privacy is generally subject to a reason-
49 Karst, supra note 12, at 344.
50 77 C.J.S. Right of Privacy § 6 (1952).
5' 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936).
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able exercise of police power.. Persons accused of crimes, whether they
are later proved to be innocent or guilty, must submit to fingerprinting
and photographing and other police record-taking. These records are
kept available for circulation to other police agencies. 52 No question of
consent is involved in such situations; rather, the necessities of proper
police operations are considered to be more important than the rights
of privacy.
In a similar manner, certain govern mental agencies are allowed by
statute, regulation, or custom to obtain records from other governmental
agencies, even though some of the information may be of a confidential
nature-that is, not accessible to the public. As was mentioned earlier,
however, some agency records are considered too confidential for such
transfer and are tightly protected.
The public's right to know about newsworthy events and people has
been held as a strong justification for allowing disclosures in the press
that would constitute invasions of privacy if not for their newsworthi-
ness. This justification has been applied to cover information of, an
educational value to the public as well.53
Substantive and procedural operations of law often require disclosure
of private information, and such disclosures are often allowed in the
form of privileged communication. Thus, the disclosure of parties to a
suit in their pleadings, and the testimony of witnesses in court and in
legislatures are permitted.
There have even been cases where one party's private need to
know has been held to be great enough to overshadow other individuals'
right to privacy. In Schmukler v. Ohio-Bell Telephone Co.,- for exam-
ple, the telephone company was permitted to monitor telephone calls in
order to detect fraudulent use of its facilities.
In these exceptions and defenses and justifications for the invasion
of an individual's privacy, the courts and legislatures have had to bal-
ance the value of privacy against the values of other social benefits.
Sometimes the only resolution was to suspend one value in favor of an-
other, but often the resolution attempted to maximize both as much as
possible. Restrictions were usually limited to the specific areas where
they were necessary, and only to the degree that was necessary. It is to
be hoped that the conflicts arising from the use of centralized informa-
tion can be managed in a similar manner.
PRIVACY IN A CENTRALIZED INFORMATION SYSTEM
The objections to the proposed central information system must be
considered in the light of the legal doctrines of privacy. One objection
to the collecting of dossier information is that it keeps personal facts
52 Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950).
5377 C.J.S. Right of Privacy § 2 (1952).
54 116 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio C.P. 1953).
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from the past in existence. To the extent that these facts were once
public, the law of privacy does not strongly recognize, this objection.
However, as discussed above, some courts have protected- individuals
from having their pasts dredged up and publicized, and this same doc-
trine would seem to apply to the use of past facts in an information
center. The California "forgive and forget" statutes suggest further that
legislative schemes for expunging might be effective in affording protec-
tion of privacy. The statutes creating a national data center, for example,
might be able to provide for routine erasure of certain kinds of informa-
tion after a given number of years had pagsed. Statutes of this kind may
appear to be an'Orwellian attempt at altering historical records, but the
purposes here would be to protect an individual's privacy, rather than
to curtail it.
Another objection to dossier files is the large probability' of errors
in a system that collects data about an individual from so many separate
sources. Errors in identity are especially likely when a large number of
similar natnes are assembled in one place. Use of numerical identifica-
tion, such as social security nuribers,'has already been made br vdri6us
governmental agencies as a way of sticcessfully avoiding identification
errors, however, and a continued doctrine of allowing an individual to
gain acceess to his own file, for monitoring and correcting, would pro-
vide a further check on errors.
Furthermore, the objections raised to the dossier systems do not
apply to purely statistical systems. Dunn emphasized, in defense of his
original report, that he was 'considering only the statistical systems and
that in such systems there was never any disclosure of personal informa-
tion or identity.5  Continued ,existence of past records and errors in
individual records are no threat to privacy as long as the infortnation is
secure.
The other objections to a centralized system pertain to the ease with
which access to the information can be gained and to the danger of sur-
reptitious use of even a statistical system for intelligence purposes. It is
in these areas that the systems pose the largest threat to individual pri-
vacy.
The laws of privacy as they presently exist might be able to protect
against some of these threats., Constitutional protection against illegal
search and seizure may be adequate to keep law enforcement agencies.
out of the system, unless they could first meet the stringent requirements
of obtaining an appropriate search warrant. The mere existence of cen-
tralized information provides no reason for the FBI or the CIA to auto-
matically have access to it. Statutory prohibition against interception of
55 Address ["The Idea of a National Data Center and the Issue of Personal Pri-
vacy"], MENSA meeting, October 21, 1966.
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communications, such as that proposed by the Right of Privacy Bill,
might equally prohibit tapping of inter-computer information transfer.
The common-law doctrines of privacy might also afford a degree of
protection. Widespread access to centralized information implies possible
disclosure to a great number of people, and disclosure of information
through the system might well be considered sufficient to establish the
legal requirement of public disclosure. The doctrine of intrusion, which
prevented the release of bank records in the Zimmerman case, might
well be extended to cover release of records in a centralized data center.
Certain aspects of the centralized systems, however, might tend to
curtail relief in the courts. The obtaining of information from the system
may become so commonplace, for example, that the courts might consider
such intrusions as inoffensive to the reasonable man. The "need to
know" justification may also become more extensive as the increased
availability of information causes increased pressure for the obtaining of
such information.5 6 More and more information might come to be con-
sidered public because of its existence in a national record file, and
this information might thus become more vulnerable to disclosure. There
may be stronger and stronger coercion to "consent" to giving personal
information as the number of agencies that use the information grows,
and the consent that is given may be deemed to apply to wider and wider
uses of the information, since the individual will be more aware of the
many users of the system.
The common law may be able to develop other lines of attack to pro-
tect information. Alan Westin suggests the recognition of privacy or
"personality" as a property right so that it can be afforded greater pro-
tection. 57 The law of negligence might be extended into the maintenance
of the information system, to insure a higher degree of care in handling
the information.
On the whole, however, common-law notions of privacy are aimed too
acutely at protection of undue publicity and emotional distress to meet
the problems of privacy in a centralized information system. Nor are
suits at law a particularly effective means of affording relief to those
whose privacy might be invaded by the system. Suits would be expen-
sive and time-consuming, and they would be especially burdensome upon
the courts if enough of the millions of potential plaintiffs found reason
to sue. Direct evidence of the invasion would probably be very difficult
to obtain, and even where plaintiffs were successful, monetary compensa-
tion would usually be inappropriate to the nature of the wrong that they
had suffered.
Legislation specifically relevant to the organization of the proposed
information center would appear to be a more appropriate legal solution.
56 Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Comi-puter to Individual Freedon
and the Right to Privacy, 33 GmO. WASH. L. REV. 270, 277 (1964).
57 A.WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDoM 325 (1967).
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With so many forms of interrelated access possible, careful legislation
would be needed to explicate precisely who is entitled to have access to
what. Criminal sanctions for misbehavior would provide a much
stronger deterrence than would the vague fear of a possible lawsuit. In
a 1966 review of the Dunn Report, a Budget Bureau Task Force Com-
mittee headed by Carl Kaysen suggested how the internal organization
of a data center might also provide for a high degree of confidentiality. 5
Accompanying the creation of statutory and organizational protection
of information in the central system, however, there might have to be
appropriate relaxation of the present security restrictions in the agen-
cies from which the centralized data is gathered. 59 Considerable care
would have to be taken to insure against legal loopholes in the security
of the system as a whole.
Even with a comprehensive statutory protection of security, though,
there still exists considerable concern that enforcement of security
measures would be difficult, if not impossible, because of great tempta-
tion and ease of access.
It is widely believed that access to a central computerized store of
information is much easier and much cheaper than is access to the vari-
ous decentralized manual records that now exist throughout the coun-
try.60 This would supposedly provide a stronger incentive than now
exists for illicit probes into private files for purposes of detection and
blackmail by individual criminals as well as by members of organized
crime syndicates. Critics of this position claim that manual probes are
just as easy as centralized probing would be, due to the rather slipshod
security habits that exist for physical records. 61 Students in a current
seminar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who have been
testing the effectiveness of security measures at their own school, have
generally had more difficulty in obtaining information from computer
records than from manual files, and many of these students are them-
selves knowledgable in computer technology.
The efforts of the computer industry to provide for security tech-
nology have thus far been minimal, but the potential for protection cir-
cuitry is high. Proposed methods for protecting computer records from
surreptitious access include: cryptography in transmission of data;
scrambled storage formats; random external auditing of record use
and program alterations; isolation of the user from all programs; iso-
lation of programmers from real data; automatic recording of users'
identity and of the resulting disclosures; detection of abnormal requests;
anti-intelligence-format programming; multi-leveled privileged modes
of operation; carefully followed user identification and authentication
58 REPORT OF THE TAsK FORCE, supra note 6.
59 REVIEW OF A PROPOSAL, supra note 8, at 35.
60 P. BARAIN, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS AND PEOPLE 11 (1965).
61 Rothman, supra note 2, at 1.
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procedures; restricted physical access -to files and hardware; and, of
course, carefully chosen personnel. The most effective way to prevent
intelligence use of a statistical system would be to use code identities
within the active system and to keep the keys to these codes-and there-
fore the information necessary to learn identities-totally inaccessible
except at certain times and to certain personnel, and then only upon
multiple signatures or keys.
62
The systems could not be foolproof, but few social dangers can be
eliminated completely. Banking has not been abandoned simply because
bank robbery can not be totally curtailed. What is necessary is that the
risks of the system be reduced to a low enough level so that the advan-
tages of the system outweigh them.. The same computer technology that
created the current widespread use of information appears to be fully
capable of protecting that information to a significant degree. At the
very least, it would seem able to make illegal access to centralized in-
formation more difficult and more expensive than access to information
available elsewhere.
Technological security, although possible, must be paid for. There
has so far been no profit motive within the computer industry for se-
curity systems, and it is unlikely that internal competition will generate
much interest in developing this phase of the technology. As the com-
puter becomes used more and more in privacy-sensitive areas, however,
the industry will be forced to realize that it is marketing a potentially
dangerous product. Like any other manufacturer of dangerous mer-
chandise, the computer industry will be expected to take the responsi-
bility for providing the necessary safety features. This responsibility has
generally been considered the price that a maker of a dangerous product
must pay for the privilege of selling the product to the public. 63 Indus-
tries that have attempted to shirk this responsibility have usually found
themselves subject to legislative regulation, as the example of the auto-
mobile industry demonstrates. However, 'whether technological security
measures are, generated from within the industry or imposed by law,
these safeguards will in all probability protect individual privacy in a
centralized statistical information center to considerable extent.
It' would thus appear likely that legal and technological arrange-
ments are capable of protecting privacy in the proposed systems for
national statistical information. If arrangements of this kind are in fact
achieved, the conflict between the value of intelligent policy planning
and the value of personal privacy can be resolved without a significant
sacrifice in either value.
62 Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behaviorial Research, 65 CoLuM. L. REv.
1184, 1205 (1965).
63 BARAN, supra note 60, at 16.
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